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Abstract: In 1981 Saltzer, Reed, and Clark identified 
“end-to-end” principles related to the design of modern 
layered protocols. The Internet today is not as transpar-
ent as envisioned by [SALTZER81].  While most of the in-
telligence remains concentrated in end-systems, users are 
now deploying more sophisticated processing within the 
network for a variety of reasons including security, net-
work management, E-commerce, and survivability.  Ap-
plications and application-layer protocols have been 
found to interact in unexpected ways with this new intelli-
gent software within the network such as proxies, address 
translators, packet filters, intrusion detection, and differ-
entiated service functions.  In this paper we survey exam-
ples of the problems caused by the introduction of this 
new processing within the network which is counter to the 
end-to-end Internet model proposed by [SALTZER81]. 
* 1 2 3 
The conflict between the end-to-end Internet model 
and the introduction of new processing within the network 
is being addressed on a case-by-case basis in each devel-
opment effort.  There are no indications that new devices 
installed within the network (which break the end-to-end 
model) will disappear and in fact there has been dramatic 
growth in their implementation due to recent denial-of-
service attacks.  Transition to IPv6 only solves a subset of 
these issues, and its deployment is proceeding slowly. Fu-
ture work is obviously needed to create a consistent envi-
ronment for protocol development that preserves the 
transparency provided by the end-to-end Internet model.  
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1.0  Introduction 
 
There are two classic models for intelligence within 
networks.[LEAR00] The first is end-systems that have no 
intelligence and the network devices to which they con-
nect provide all the services.  The telephone system is an 
example of just such a network.  The absence of intelli-
gence in end-devices makes them inexpensive to manu-
facture and manage but the network devices (central of-
fice switches) become expensive and complex to 
maintain.  
 
The second model is the end-to-end Internet model4 
proposed by Saltzer, Reed, and Clark in 1981. 
[SALTER84]    This model is a set of architectural princi-
ples that guide the placement of functions within a dis-
tributed system.  According to this principle, lower layers 
of a distributed system should avoid attempting to provide 
functions that can be implemented in end-systems espe-
cially if the function cannot be completely implemented 
in lower layers and some applications might not benefit 
from such functions at all. 
 
The end-to-end model shifts intelligence to the end-
systems, thus also shifting cost and management com-
plexity from routers/switches to end-systems. Another 
benefit of the end-to-end model is congestion control can 
be managed between end-systems, not requiring state in-
formation be kept within routers such that network de-
vices can be optimized for performance.5   In end-to-end 
design, the network simply acts as a transparent transport 
mechanism for individual packets with each packet being 
labeled by a globally unique source/destination addresses. 
The notion of “transparency” demands that network de-
vices between two end-systems not modify information 
within the packet above layer 2 (data link layer), except 
                                                          
4 we use the term “end-to-end model” while acknowledg-
ing that the original authors prefer to use the terminology 
“end-to-end arguments” 
5 noted Internet researcher Van Jacobson is quoted as stat-
ing, “Very simple.  A router has only three choices when 
presented with a packet.  It can transmit the packet.  It can 
delay (queue) the packet. Or it can throw the packet 
away.” [CHEN98]  
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under well-defined circumstances (i.e., decrement the 
TTL or record route).  Changing IP addresses is not 
viewed as acceptable, nor is any change to layer 4 or 
above.   
 
 
2.0  The Problem: Unexpected Protocol Inter-
actions 
 
 The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has 
been instrumental in supporting the end-to-end Internet 
model with “rough consensus and working code.”6  In 
fact, one of the authors of the original end-to-end model 
paper, David Clark, chaired the Internet Activities Board 
(IAB) overseeing the IETF from 1981 to 1989.  In reflect-
ing on the state of the Internet in late 1999, a current 
member of the IAB and present/past chair of numerous 
IETF working groups, Steve Deering7, summarized his 
thoughts on intelligence within networks with a slide - 
“Internet is Losing?”8   Examples he used include:  
 
• unique IP addresses are no longer necessary 
• the Internet is not always on (many users log-on via 
American On-Line etc.) 
• end-to-end transparency is often blocked behind net-
work address translators and firewalls   
 
While most of the intelligence remains concentrated 
in end-systems, users are increasingly deploying more so-
phisticated processing within the network for a variety of 
reasons including security, network management, E-
commerce, and survivability.  The following are some 
specific examples: 
 
• The use of network address translators to solve IP 
address depletion problems. 
• The use of performance enhancing proxies to tune 
protocols on links with unusual characteristics. 
• The use of tunneling and other virtual private net-
work techniques to provide secure connectivity over 
the Internet to an organization’s intranet/extranet. 
• The use of firewalls and intrusion detection to pre-
vent and respond to malicious attacks. 
• The deployment of quality-of-service mechanisms to 
provide delay, delay jitter, and packet loss guarantees 
to applications and network services. 
 
Each of these examples address important problems 
that need to be solved.  Rather than debate the benefit of 
each such device and or their legitimacy with the network, 
                                                          
6 motto of the IETF 
7 Steve Deering is also the inventor of IP multicast and 
lead designer of the next generation Internet Protocol 
(IPv6). 
8 Closing Talk of Networked Group Communications 
Conference (NGC’99), Pisa Italy, Nov. 19, 1999. 
we accept the notion that such devices are here to stay for 
the short-term and that the transparency of the end-to-end 
model as we know it can not be re-established through re-
quirements of their non-existence.  The end-to-end Inter-
net model is broken and needs to be repaired.    The prob-
lem is acerbated in that it is impossible to detect 
intelligent network devices and there now actually exists 
guidance within the IETF itself on how to build such de-
vices.   
 
While IP next generation, IPv6, has been designed to 
solve many of these problems, migration will take time. 
Not only do protocol stacks and routers have to be up-
graded but applications with hard-coded IPv4 addresses 
have to be changed (an effort similar to Y2K without a 
hard deadline).  The good news is that IPv6 has been de-
signed so that IPv4 and IPv6 can coexist with IPv6 de-
ployed gradually.  In the meantime, applications and ap-
plication-layer protocols have been found to interact in 
unexpected ways with intelligent network devices within 
the current end-to-end IPv4 Internet model. This is to be 
expected since intelligent network devices reduce trans-
parency and the key element of transparency is some abil-
ity to predict how the network will behave.[CHEN98]  To 
quote from a 1998 paper from the original authors of the 
end-to-end model: 
 
“Since lower-level network resources are shared among 
many different users with different applications, the com-
plexity of potential interactions among independent users 
rises with the complexity of the behaviors that the users or 
applications can request.  For example, when the lower 
layer offers a simple store-and-forward packet transport 
service, interactions take the form of end-to-end delay 
that can be modeled by relatively straightforward queue-
ing models.  Adding priority mechanisms (to limit the 
impact of congestion) that are fixed at design time adds 
modest complexity to models that predict the behavior of 
the system.  But relatively simple programming capabili-
ties, such as allowing packets to change priority dy-
namically within the network, may create behaviors that 
are intractable to model….”[CHEN98]  
 
Thus, maintaining the largest degree of network transpar-
ency simultaneously constrains interactions among differ-
ent users of a shared lower level such that network behav-
ior can be predicted.  We have also found the opposite is 
true: diminishing transparency increases unexpected in-
teractions between protocols.  We have identified three 
distinct types of protocol interactions that have been in-
troduced by the diminishing of transparency due to the 
deployment of intelligent network devices: 
 
• Some network devices either attempt to read/modify 
portions of transmitted packets which the sending 
system assumes fixed. [i.e., performance enhancing 
proxies, network address translators] 
531
• The use of IP tunnels creates the design issue of how 
to construct the second “outer” IP header upon tunnel 
ingress9, and the more complicated issue of whether 
the original “inner” IP header needs to be modified 
upon tunnel egress10 based on changes that interme-
diate nodes made to the outer header.[i.e., tunneling 
and virtual private networks] 
• Some devices on purpose, or due to limits in their de-
sign, prevent some packets from traversing that de-
vice. [i.e., firewalls, intrusion detection] 
  
In this paper we examine these protocol interactions 
in an effort to understand recent protocol design decisions 
and their effect on the transparency provided by the end-
to-end Internet model.   We are particularly interested in 
examining the protocol structures involved to determine 
why the traditional protection against protocol interac-
tions inherent in the layered protocols could not prevent 
the observed problems. The remainder of this paper is or-
ganized as follows:  Section 3 describes the use and inter-
action of  network address translators and performance 
enhancing proxies.  Section 4 examines the use of tunnel-
ing to create virtual private networks.  Section 5 discusses 
the use and interaction of packet filtering/correlation with 
firewalls and intrusion detection devices and the implica-
tions of IPsec.  Section 6 discusses the use and interac-
tions of proposed quality-of-service mechanisms. In Sec-




3.0  Network Address Translators (NATs) / 
Performance Enhancing Proxies (PEPs) 
 
NATs allow the use of private IP addresses in a pri-
vate intranet while maintaining connectivity to the Inter-
net through one or more global IP addresses.  Since many 
applications assume that the end-system address is glob-
ally unique, NATs usually require application level gate-
ways which modify application-specific sections of the 
packet where the end-system address has been embedded.  
These gateways cause changes in the packet that are 
unanticipated by the end-systems.[HAIN00, 
HOLDREGE00] A Network Address and Port Translator 
(NAPT) cannot forward a connection request from the 
Internet to a private network unless an administrative 
mapping has been provided for the port requested in the 
incoming packet.  Other packets may be dropped or mis-
routed because the NAPT does not have the appropriate 
application-level gateway and thus fails to make correc-
tions in the packet to allow the application’s peer to re-
spond.11 
                                                          
9 ingress is a path going into a network 
10 egress is a path exiting from a network  
11 It should also be noted that with the advent of dial-up 
Internet users whose IP address is allocated at dial-up 
PEPs are used in networks with unusual link charac-
teristics.[ALLMAN99] These proxies may attempt to read 
transport-level information in the packet or they may add 
and delete packets from the flow.  Many of these proxies 
can be bypassed by flows that do not permit such interac-
tions, at risk of suffering from poor performance. Both 
NAT and PEP devices vastly complicate the deployment 
of IP-level security between end-systems [KRUSE99], 
and they may cause other failures that can be difficult to 
diagnose [CARPENTER00].  For instance, both the NAT 
and PEP devices usually do not report the fact that they 
either failed to correctly handle a packet, were bypassed, 
or dropped a packet they could not process due to insuffi-
cient information.   Encrypted packets will be examined 
by the security software at the receiving end where modi-
fications made by the NAT or PEP device will be inter-
preted as illegal tampering and the packet will be dis-
carded by the security software.  While dropping packets 
is an auditable event, the sender of the packet is usually 
not notified. 
 
The deployment of NAPT devices is usually driven 
by a shortage of IPv4 addresses, and the resulting ISP 
policies and rates that limit the number of permanent ad-
dresses a user can acquire.  IPv6 deployment is the obvi-
ous, but long-term, solution to this issue.  PEP devices are 
introduced for different reasons and will continue to exist 
in the IPv6 network. 
 
 
4.0 Tunneling and Virtual Private Net-
works (VPNs)  
 
IP tunnels are defined as a section of the network in 
which IP packets are encapsulated inside a second IP 
header (often called the “outer header”).  The tunnel is 
designed to transport packets between two intermediate 
points in the network, without making reference to the ac-
tual IP packets during the tunnel section of the packet’s 
path.  Tunnels can serve a number of purposes including: 
 
• Transport of multiple protocols over an IPv4 router 
infrastructure (i.e., IPv6, IPX, Appletalk) as well as 
service types not supported by intermediate nodes 
(i.e., multicast backbone or MBONE). 
• Tunnels provide secure passage between two nodes at 
the edges of trusted domains.  Inside the tunnel, 
                                                                                              
time, the actual IP addresses of such users is purely tran-
sient.  During their period of validity they can be relied 
upon end-to-end but these IP numbers have no permanent 
associations with the domain name of any host and are 
recycled for reuse at the end of every session.  Similarly, 
LAN-based users typically use DHCP (Dynamic Host 
Control Protocol) to acquire a new address at system re-
start 
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original IP packets are encrypted and therefore com-
pletely inaccessible. 
• Creation of VPNs.  In this scheme, packets between 
two sites are carried over IP tunnels to provide isola-
tion from the addressing and routing requirements of 
the Internet.  A similar type of tunnel can be used to 
connect an off-site user to the corporate network. 
 
The use of tunnels creates specific types of protocol 
interaction problems.  Specifically how should the outer 
IP header be constructed at the tunnel ingress point? In 
general it seems reasonable to copy fields from the origi-
nal IP header, however, this is not always the correct ap-
proach.  In networks that provide quality of service con-
trol through resource reservation [TERZIS00] or 
differentiated service [BLAKE98], the tunnel may be 
used to traverse a portion of the network that cannot pro-
vide these services, and therefore requires that some of 
the original IP settings not be copied.  In other cases 
[FLOYD00], the ability of the tunnel egress point to pro-
vide certain types of processing will determine how to 
construct the outer IP header. 
 
By far the more complicated issues arise upon tunnel 
egress.  Some portions of the outer IP header may have 
been modified during tunnel traversal.  Examples include 
updating of header fields that mark the packet as being in 
a particular differentiated service group, or updating of 
fields designed to provide explicit congestion notification 
to end-points.  The tunnel egress node must merge the 
original IP header with the – possibly modified – outer IP 
header.  The rules for doing this are ambiguous and dif-
ferent rules may emerge.  For example, from a perform-
ance and application perspective, one may wish to propa-
gate congestion notification information across security 
tunnels.  From a security perspective, one may wish to 
discard the outer IP header, regardless of its content, to 
prevent attacks based on the ability of hostile systems to 
modify the unprotected outer IP header inside the tunnel. 
 
 
5.0 Firewalls, Intrusion Detection, and IP-
sec 
 
Several devices discard packets before they reach the 
end-system destination address.  Most prominently, fire-
walls are designed to do just that for all packets that have 
not been entered in a permission list.   Firewalls, by their 
very nature, fundamentally diminish transparency.  Typi-
cally the source is not notified of the fact that the packet 
was dropped (although auditing of dropped packets can be 
performed at the firewall).  In order to prevent attacks, 
many corporate firewalls will not permit network man-
agement packets (i.e., ICMP) to pass through. Note that 
these issues are unrelated to the availability of address 
space, and will continue into the IPv6 network. 
 
Intrusion detection (ID) is a monitoring and auditing 
system for attempted and successful system breaches with 
the goal of detecting and ultimately preventing such activ-
ity. Because many attacks can be recognized by their sig-
nature (headers), the best place to process information is 
at the network layer.  Since ID is based on algorithms 
which correlate network layer information with signa-
tures, it requires large amounts of storage. The state-of-
the-art is reactive off-line processing.   ID systems are 
currently maturing and the next generation will rely on 
integration with routers to proactively monitor activity in 
real-time.  One example of a transparency issue related to 
ID systems is fragmentation.  While fragmentation is a 
useful method for supporting various media on internet-
works, it may mean caching packets at the ID system to 
reassemble for inspection – a process that destroys trans-
parency and could be a performance bottleneck.  
 
At the other end of the spectrum from filtering and 
correlating packets is security.  IPsec is actually an archi-
tecture  - a collection of protocols, authentication, and en-
cryption mechanisms – as described in [KENT98].  The 
loss of transparency is both a bug and a feature from the 
security standpoint.  To the extent it prevents the end-to-
end deployment of IPsec, it damages security and creates 
vulnerabilities.  For example, if a NAT is in the path, the 
best that can be done is to decrypt and re-encrypt IP traf-
fic in the NAT with the traffic momentarily in plaintext.  
Noting NATs are prime targets for attack already, this is 
unacceptable. Indeed, NATs break other security mecha-
nisms as well, such as Kerberos and DNSSEC, since they 
rely upon address values.   In a weaker sense, the loss of 
transparency at an Intranet/Internet boundary may be con-
sidered a security feature since it is a well-defined point to 
enforce security policy.  However, such a security strat-
egy is vulnerable to insider attack and boundary penetra-
tions which expose the entire intranet to trivial attack.   
Lastly, where cryptographic algorithms are used, proto-
cols should be designed to permit alternative algorithms 
to be used.  There have been several efforts by corpora-
tions to embed their own patented cryptographic algo-
rithms within a protocol to capture a market while at the 
same time severely limiting end-to-end transparency. 
 
 
6.0 Quality-of-Service (QoS) Mechanisms 
 
 Classically, the end-to-end model views the net-
work as a monolithic entity that provides a single QoS to 
all users, best-effort delivery.  The Internet has expanded 
to incorporate applications with requirements for guaran-
tees on network behavior beyond the best-effort delivery.  
In the case of mechanisms such as RSVP, the host signals 
to the network the level of service it requires, whereas 
with differentiated services the network prioritizes traffic 
without the host’s knowledge or consent.[BRADEN97, 
BLAKE98]   Both end-systems and network devices co-
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operate to provide deterministic and statistical guarantees 
on QoS metrics such as delay, delay jitter variation, and 





In this paper we have presented the evolving chal-
lenges to the overall transparency of the end-to-end Inter-
net model as proposed by Saltzer, Reed, and Clark.  It can 
be argued that the transparency inherent to the end-to-end 
model is in many ways responsible for the engineering 
success of the Internet.  However, with unprecedented 
growth of the Internet has come pressure to violate the 
end-to-end model.  We have documented examples of 
where Internet protocols designed for end-to-end trans-
parency will not work in a world where packets have to 
traverse intelligent network devices such as NATs and 
firewalls.  The large investment in intelligent network de-
vices has been for valid reasons and this installed infra-
structure will not be easily changed.   
 
The trend continues toward incorporating more proc-
essing within the network.   Active network research 
ranges from packets programming routers to routers mak-
ing pre-programmed decisions based on packet con-
tent.12[TENNENHOUSE97]   In response to recent de-
nial-of-service attacks, the IETF is convening an “itrace” 
BOF13 to process reverse path state information on pack-
ets within intermediate routers using ICMP traceback 
mechanisms. There is a tension building between provid-
ing end-systems knowledge of network conditions to pro-
vide enhanced services versus increased security vulner-
abilities based on this knowledge.14  The IETF has issued 
an Internet draft on “Fog Lamps” to improve visibility of 
network devices to end-systems, a view directly opposed 
to the transparency view of the end-to-end Internet 
model.[LEAR00]    
 
Nothing less than the future of the Internet as we 
know it is at stake.[CARPENTER00]  In one scenario a 
complete migration to IPv6 potentially allows the restora-
tion of a global address space and end-to-end transpar-
ency albeit with firewalls and PEPs still remaining.  At 
the other extreme, only a partial IPv6 deployment leads to 
fragmentation of the network layer, with global connec-
tivity resembling islands of connectivity.   The eventual 
                                                          
12 While some researchers have attacked “active network-
ing” as not scalable and destabilizing, it is premature to 
make such determinations. 
13 ICMP Traceback (itrace) Birds-of-a-Feather (BOF) at 
the 47th IETF meeting, Chair: Steve Bellovin, 3/30/00 
15:30-17:30 
14 Increased knowledge of conditions within the network 
may make additional diagnostic information available to 
interloping devices. 
solution to this debate will determine the utility of the 
Internet and its future as the next generation infrastruc-
ture.   
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